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ASIA

In most areas of non-Communist Asia the CP's are desirous of increasing their strength and influence and are presently focusing their efforts upon overt political action to gain broader support. Their use of militancy has corresponded undeviatingly to the Soviet global tactic. Terrorism and sabotage were common throughout the area and in several SEA countries there were almost simultaneous outbreaks of Communist paramilitary action in the period 1948-1951 when the CPSU line required such action. In many areas the sabotage and violence continued but with modification in compliance with a Cominform reminder to follow the example of Chinese Communist revolutionists. Sabotage and terrorism were subsequently, for the most part, restricted to "imperialist" targets and to collaborators of the imperialists--the local police and security forces. Efforts were made to win broader support among nationalist groups.

After the Soviet call for use of the united front tactic, violence was rarely employed by the Asiatic parties (except in Burma, Malaya, Vietnam) and from early 1954 to 1957 there was rarely a departure from use of peaceful, united front political action. In 1957 the Soviet tactic was modified again and called for increased but disciplined use of militancy.

In the near future Communists of the Asian Free World countries will be alert to exploit every issue possible to advance their political aims and influence; they will stage demonstrations and other manifestations of protest which appear to support workers' or nationalists' interests and they will probably carry out frequent strike action; in most cases (except in areas where a disturbed political situation already exists, as in Indonesia for example) CP's will refrain from violence which will invite police repression or cause loss of support. In colonial and former colonial areas aggression of a more extreme form is always possible in view of the fact the Communists in these areas must exploit to the utmost every occasion to further nationalist goals.

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LATIN AMERICA

In 1954 and 1956 there were two reports that continent-wide plans existed for Communist sabotage in Latin America to be undertaken in the event of an international conflict. One of these reports originated in Argentina and the other in Chile; both are unconfirmed.

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[REDACTED] believed that the CP was instigating railroad sabotage in early 1956 and that the Party was using foreigners as saboteurs. According to unconfirmed reports from Bolivia weekly meetings were being held in September 1957 to teach leaders of CP Bolivia in university circles how to make "Molotov cocktail" bombs.

Railway sabotage was extensive in certain areas of Brazil in 1950-1951 and in most instances Communists were found to be responsible. In 1957, there was violent strike action in Sao Paulo as well as a Communist attack on an arms and an ammunitions factory in that city. Serious damage was done to oil pipelines in the dock area at Santos, Brazil, in January 1957.

Also according to an unconfirmed report the Social Action Committee, a group of Liberals and Communists in Colombia, was planning in 1956 to train a sabotage team to work against the government. In Cuba one of the principal lawyers of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Communist) was arrested in October 1954 on charges of possession of a home-made bomb and Communist propaganda and of terrorist activity to impede elections. One Cuban Communist youth leader was reported to have received training in sabotage in Communist China in 1950, but this report also was never confirmed.

The CP in Uruguay has succeeded occasionally in stirring up demonstrations protesting the showing of anti-Soviet films, exploiting local grievances or celebrating Communist holidays. Industrial sabotage in the form of slowdowns and frequent strike action was carried out in 1957. The CP Uruguay had organized strong-arm squads and was using these groups in November 1957 to protect Soviet installations and CP rallies during the 7 November celebrations. The groups were still being used in one industrial area in late November to break up meetings of certain other political parties. In 1952 in Venezuela

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there were two cases of industrial sabotage but there was no proof of Communist Party involvement. An unconfirmed report stated that if an uprising had taken place in Caracas against the assumption of the Presidency by Colonel Marcos PEREZ Jimenez, Communists would have collaborated with the Accion Democratica in sabotage action.

In Guatemala in July 1956 there were several attempts to blow up railway tracks and a tunnel, but there was no proof that Communists were responsible. As of February 1957 the Guatemalan Communist Party's policy was "against recourse to coup and terrorism" but to instigate partial strikes wherever necessary, protest demonstrations, rallies and assemblies "to the extent possible without committing provocations and without offering a target."

In summary, while there are reports indicating that in several areas the Communist parties of Latin America are making preparations for more aggressive strike action as well as for eventual sabotage and other forms of violence to be used in the event of an international conflict, it does not appear that terrorism and sabotage will be employed in most areas in the near future. Since many Latin American countries are still considered by Communists to be colonial in nature, if not in political status, every incident or local grievance probably will be the occasion for the staging of protests and demonstrations in order to further nationalist and leftist aims. In most instances, however, demonstrations probably will be contained in order not to provoke police repression.

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